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Research

Working papers:

Government Audits of Municipal Corruption and Belief Updating: Experimental from a Field Experiment (with Raymond Duch). Unpublished paper badge Data badge

Abstract We implemented a field experiment that assesses whether citizens update corruption beliefs when presented with audit information about malfeasance in their municipal government. The video treatment reports audit results for Chilean municipalities; the control is a placebo video. We measure incentivized pre-treatment and post-treatment corruption beliefs of 5,528 subjects. When informed about corruption in their municipality subjects update negatively. Updating is correlated with reported malfeasance and with trends in malfeasance. We find limited evidence of Bayesian learning. Treatment effects persist after one-month. We observe higher donations to local public goods by treated subjects in municipalities with more positive audits.

Choice Architecture for Messaging Corruption: Evidence from an Adaptive Experiment (With Raymond Duch).

Abstract The presentation and framing of information are the foundations of many behavioural experiments. In the case of corruption, policymakers such as NGOs face the challenge of informing citizens about the levels of malfeasance found in their local constituency. This challenge implies identifying an optimal messaging strategy that is sufficiently compelling to attract the interest of citizens. We addressed this challenge by evaluating six strategies for information messages often used in corruption information experiments. Using historical data from local government audit reports in Chile and in partnership with the NGO Chile Transparente, we implemented an online adaptive experiment using a modified Thompson Sampling algorithm (Exploration sampling) in which the assignment probabilities of the information treatments were updated in 11 batches of 100 subjects each. The results showed no unique optimal information strategy for malfeasance messages. However, a loss-frame information strategy tends to be slightly more persuasive than other ways of conveying information about corruption. We also found evidence that more rudimentary information metrics of corruption can be equally persuasive compared to more sophisticated ones. Finally, we do not found significant differences between using spatial comparison (i.e. comparing corruption in a local government across local constituencies within the same region) versus a temporal comparison (i.e. comparing the same local government across time).

Measuring Corruption using Bayesian Randomise Item Response Model (with Ahra Wu). Unpublished paper badge Data badge

Abstract Measuring the prevalence of corrupt behavior using surveys have been a challenge due to social desirability and non-responses biases. A whole number of indirect questioning survey techniques has been designed and conducted to elicit truthful answers to sensitive issue. However, most of the popular used techniques in the field of political science and economics are restrained to measure group-level prevalence of the sensitive behavior. In order to circumvent this limitation, we conducted a Randomized Item Count Response Technique (n = 6058 and n = 3692) that allowed us to estimate individual-level experiences of corrupt behavior at the local level.

Explaining Public Support for Foreign Aid Projects: Evidence from France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States (With Jennifer Hudson, David Hudson, Soomin Oh, Paolo Morini).Data badge

Abstract Public support is understood to be a condition for foreign aid spending in donor countries. But do donor publics have preferences on which aid projects foreign aid is spent? Drawing on a new dataset examining four donor countries – France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States (n= 26,169) – we leverage a unique conjoint experiment to better understand which attributes of aid projects generate more or less support with donor publics. Our results show that respondents are more likely to support projects targeting water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), food security, and heath programmes. Projects focused on gender equality, environment, infrastructure and social protection are negatively associated with support. In line with our expectations, we find effects for need and aid effectiveness: higher levels of extreme poverty and effectiveness of aid are associated with support for the development project, whereas low levels of need and low effectiveness are negatively associated with support. Second, we find few effects for region, with less support for projects targeted to the Middle East and Northern Africa. Finally, our main findings are robust when we remove need and effectiveness as attributes, demonstrating while these are important drivers of support, they do not crowd out other attributes or dimensions. Our findings show that in addition to preferences on overall levels of foreign aid spending, donor publics have a consistent set of preferences on how aid is spent.

Data Unleashed: Exploring Global Perspectives from the Development Engagement Lab’s Database (With Jennifer Hudson, David Hudson, Soomin Oh, Paolo Morini) Data badge

Abstract To be added soon.

Working in progress:

Deeds and Words: Linking Attitudes and Actions on Global Poverty and Development (With Jennifer Hudson, David Hudson, Soomin Oh, Paolo Morini).

Abstract Political scientists have often looked at factors affecting attitudinal and behavioural indicators to study public engagement with political issues, but studies which consider the effects of each on the other are less common, due, amongst other factors, to data availability constraints. In this paper, we leverage on a novel four-year longitudinal panel study of public engagement with global poverty and sustainable development in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States (2019-2022) to draw connections between attitudinal and behavioural engagement in this domain. Specifically, we look at ten behavioural engagement indicators (from news consumption to volunteering, to participating in demonstrations), and attitudinal indicators capturing the public’s moral views on global poverty and development, their concern for the issue, and their world view on inequalities and global challenges. We exploit variation in time and across individuals in a cross-lagged panel model to identify causal effects of each on the other. We show that changes in a respondent’s moral views at any one time predicts changes in behavioural engagement in the following time in a series of behavioural indicators, but also that people taking actions also change their views on global poverty. We draw implications for charities, NGOs and governments engaged in efforts to involve publics in donor countries with their work to tackle poverty worldwide.

A Meta-Analysis on the effects of Clientelism on voters’ Behaviour (Single-authored).

Abstract Clientelism has remained a pervasive phenomenon, undermining the integrity of elections and overall trust in the political system. Across disciplines, scholars have examined the effect of clientelism on several political and non-political outcomes. Numerous studies have provided empirical evidence on the strategic allocation of clientelistic benefits by politicians/brokers based on the type of voters they target and the type of benefits they provide. Although there is an implicit consensus on the direction of the impact of clientelism on these outcomes, there seems to be considerable heterogeneity regarding the magnitude of its impact. To be the best of my knowledge, no study has attempted to identify the pooled effect of this phenomenon across different contexts. This project will systematically identify published quantitative studies that have estimated the effects of clientelism in the last decade. Through meta-analysis, I will estimate the inverse variance-weighted average effect of clientelistic benefits on voters’ voting behaviour and their underlying beliefs about the quality of institutions. Secondly, using meta-regressions, I will explore the heterogeneity of effects of clientelism by estimating if the effects vary by the type of voters that politicians/brokers target (looking at ideological leanings, socioeconomic status, reciprocal voters, and historical ties) and the type of benefits that politicians/brokers provide (private vs excludable, different local benefits, and cash vs non-cash benefits). These analyses will help identify if there is an underlying effect of clientelism and understand what drives these effects.

The Spillover Effects of Audits (Single-authored).

Abstract Governments across the globe have set audits as one of the primary mechanisms to measure and deter corruption. This paper focuses on the spillover effects of audits within local governments in Chile. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I exploit the discontinuity in allocating audits within local governments/departments to estimate the effects of audits within departments within each municipality. The fuzzy RD results will be completed using panel data from audits conducted between 2014-2024. I expect to present the preliminary results of both estimation strategies pre-registered in the analysis plan at the conference.

The Impact of Government Audits on Curbing Corruption Among Civil Servants (with Luis Soto Tamayo).

Abstract Government audits, widely implemented to increase accountability, promote transparency, and identify patronage practices within the public sector, have been shown by early research to be an effective tool in curbing corruption. This paper focuses on the impact of audits on civil servants by looking at two main aspects: first, whether audits effectively discourage ‘rent-extraction’ behaviour among civil servants, and second, whether the audits have a moderated effect on civil servants with family affiliations, who may be more institutionally protected and more prone to resource misallocation. We employ a unique dataset sourced from Chile's 2016 financial and performance audits of civil servants and leverage the random audit assignment across 20 governmental institutions over 8,640 public servants.